Document Type : Research Article
Authors
1 Level 4 Researcher at Qom Seminary; Ph.D. Student in Islamic Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Law, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2 Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law (Farabi College), University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.
Abstract
Among the presumptive grounds of evidence which, despite the legislature's silence and perhaps even contrary to Article 1315 of the Civil Code, which identifies knowledge as the standard for testimony, have been introduced in the writings of certain jurists as an exception permitting the giving of testimony based on knowledge, and have consequently raised doubts regarding the extent to which testimony may be deemed admissible on their basis, is the principle of Istishab (presumption of continuity). Given the significant legal consequences of testimony and its extensive role in establishing claims, an investigation employing a descriptive-analytical method and a library-based research approach is necessary to clarify its ambiguous dimensions and prevent unintended deviations in the legislative process. This study seeks to answer the fundamental question: To what extent is testimony based on Istishab valid under Imami jurisprudence?
The findings indicate that where a person testifies on the basis of an apparent ruling (ḥukm ẓāhirī), and is not required to testify to the actual state of affairs but is instead asked to testify in general terms, such that testimony based on an apparent ruling is also legally effective, the admissibility of such testimony, grounded in a practical legal principle such as Istishab, insofar as it reflects the content of the apparent ruling, encounters no legal impediment. Given that the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and judicial practice remain silent in most such cases, presumptive forms of testimony lack sufficient legal validity and may be accepted only in specific circumstances, at the judge's discretion, as weak circumstantial evidence. It therefore appears that, by drawing upon the considerable potential of Imami jurisprudence and distinguishing between testimony concerning apparent legal circumstances and testimony concerning actual facts, a stronger legislative foundation is needed in this area.
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